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Abstract 
This paper discusses a model based on the agency theory to analyze the optimal transfer of construction risk in public works contracts. 
The base assumption is that of a contract between a principal (public authority) and an agent (firm), where the payment mechanism is 
linear and contains an incentive mechanism to enhance the effort of the agent to reduce construction costs. A theoretical model is 
proposed starting from a cost function with a random component and assuming that both the public authority and the firm are risk 
averse. The main outcome of the paper is that the optimal transfer of construction risk will be lower when the variance of errors in cost 
forecast, the risk aversion of the firm and the marginal cost of public funds are larger, while the optimal transfer of construction risk will 
grow when the variance of errors in cost monitoring and the risk aversion of the public authority are larger.  
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo se elabora un modelo basado en la teoría de la agencia para analizar la transferencia óptima del riesgo de construcción 
en los contratos públicos de obras. El supuesto de partida consiste en un contrato entre un principal (Administración Pública) y un 
agente (contratista), con un sistema de remuneración basado en una fórmula de tipo lineal que incluye unos determinados parámetros 
que definen los incentivos para inducir el esfuerzo del contratista en la gestión de los costes. El modelo teórico se desarrolla a partir de 
una función de costes con un componente aleatorio, y suponiendo que tanto la Administración como el contratista presentan aversión 
al riesgo. Como resultados principales del trabajo cabe destacar que la transferencia óptima del riesgo de construcción al contratista 
será menor cuanto mayor sea la varianza de los errores de previsión de los costes de construcción, cuanto mayor sea la aversión al 
riesgo del contratista y cuanto mayor sea el coste marginal de los recursos públicos. Por el contrario, la transferencia óptima del riesgo 
de construcción será mayor cuanto mayor sea la varianza de los errores de medición de los costes y cuanto mayor sea la aversión al 
riesgo de la Administración. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
BACKGROUND AND STATE OF THE ART 
 
There has been a notable increase in interest over recent years 
in the analysis of risk sharing in public procurement 
contracts for the provision of infrastructure and services. In 
more specific terms, the focus of the analysis is the 
optimisation of the transfer of risks between a specific public 
authority and a company constructing an infrastructure or 
managing a public service through a contractual relation 
between them.  
 
A suitable theoretic framework to conduct this type of 
analysis is that of agency theory, which has undergone 
considerable development since its origins back in the 
1970’s. In general terms, this theory attempts to explain the 
agency relationship whereby one party (the principal) 
delegates certain tasks to another party (the agent), and 
where this relation is regulated by a contract or by similar 
means (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The agency problem 
arises under conditions of asymmetric information between 
the principal and the agent when there is a conflict of 
interest and where it is difficult or excessively expensive for 
the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In these cases, the research conducted 
into the principal-agent relationship is based on the 
specification of a series of assumptions regarding the 
possible means by which the principal may provide 
incentives to the agent in order to bring their respective 
objectives into line. On the basis of these assumptions and 
by a method of deduction, it is then possible to find a 
solution to the problem of contract optimization. 
 
Agency theory has been applied to many different fields of 
activity and different countries ever since its origins (Harris 
and Raviv, 1978). Among the first studies applied to the 
relationship between a public authority and an agent, 
reference may be made to those of Loeb and Magat (1979) 
and Baron and Myerson (1982) that focused on the problem 
of the regulation of a natural monopoly under conditions of 
asymmetric information between the authorities (principal) 
and the company providing the asset or service (agent). 
Reference may similarly be made to the work of Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) on systematizing this area of economic 
analysis, and on extending its application to different fields, 
including public procurement. 
 
The problems of information asymmetry traditionally 
considered within the framework of agency theory are 
those of adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
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selection refers to a situation where a principal (such as a 
public authority) is unaware of certain characteristics of the 
agent (firm) they have contracted and particularly when 
they may have incomplete information regarding the 
productive efficiency of the agent. The problem of moral 
hazard refers to the difficulty of the principal to observe 
and verify the performance of the agent, this on account 
that frequently the principal cannot observe the effort 
made by the agent to control production costs or to 
improve the quality of the assets or services provided. In 
the light of these voids in the information available to the 
principal, the objective of agency theory is, as stated above, 
to analyze the optimal forms of incentives that should be 
included in the corresponding contract. 
 
The problem of the agency relationship becomes more 
complex when one or more of the variables involved (such 
as production costs) has a random component. In these 
cases the efficient sharing of risks between the principal 
and the agent takes on particular importance, this being an 
aspect that then requires the search for an efficient 
incentive mechanism. Generally speaking, the problem of 
risk allocation arises when there are different attitudes 
towards risk by the contracting parties (Arrow, 1971). In 
agency theory, it is generally assumed that the agent is risk-
averse and the principal is risk-neutral or, at the very least, 
that the agent is more averse to risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Dewatripont and Legros, 2005; Sadka, 2007), though this 
assumption may be questioned as is indeed considered 
further on in this paper. 
 
 
Figure 1 A typical building construction. Source http://thealsgroup.com 
(visited 01.12.2013) 
 
 
 
Within the area of public procurement, one particularly relevant 
and potentially sizeable risk is the construction risk in works 
contracts or other forms of contract, such as concessions or 
public-private partnerships. In this paper we shall consider 
construction risk essentially as the risk of deviation with respect 
to the costs budgeted for the works, for various possible 
reasons: incorrect specifications or measurements in the 
design, work delays, changes in the prices of inputs, unforeseen 
geotechnical problems, etc. Administrative procedures in many 
different countries reveal a series of different methods for 
allocating these types of risks. In public-private partnerships the 
vast majority of construction risks tend to be assigned to the 
contractor, while in work contracts, to the contrary, there is a 
greater tendency for the authorities to assume a significant 
proportion of these risks. For example, work contracts tend to 
employ price indexing formulas to protect the contractor from 
ensuing deviations in the costs of construction materials, energy 
costs or labour costs. 
 
The criterion generally established in the literature on risk 
sharing is that each of the contracting parties should take on 
those risks they are capable of managing at the lowest cost 
(Debande, 2002; Huidobro et al., 2009). When following this 
criteria, it is accepted that the majority of the technical and 
economic risks (such as construction risks) should be assumed 
by the agent, while the principal (in this case a public authority) 
tends to assume the political risks (such as public opposition to 
the project) or those derived from situations of force majeure, 
such as natural catastrophes (Yescombe, 2007). However, and 
as we shall see in this paper, there is no theoretical basis for the 
complete allocation of a particular type of risk to just one of the 
contracting parties and, instead, an adequate risk sharing 
should be established in accordance with a series of 
parameters. 
 
The traditional focus of public contracts under agency theory 
tends to concentrate on the simultaneous presence of problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. In this case, the 
additional presence of a random component in the cost 
function makes it very complicated to solve the problem 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1986). In the case of construction, however, 
and as opposed to that of other industries, cost deviations are 
both frequent and sizeable, partly because of the very nature of 
the activity. For this reason it is important to make the analysis 
of the principal-agent relationship under risk conditions. In this 
respect, the main contribution of this work is to elaborate upon 
the relationship between a public authority and a contractor in 
accordance with a function of random costs and where the 
problem of information asymmetry is purely restricted to a case 
of moral hazard, in order to make the problem more 
approachable. The main idea behind this focus is that, within 
this specific context, the application of contract incentives to 
the agent comes into conflict with its risk aversion and leads to 
a duality of objectives by, on the one hand, paying the 
productive work of the agent and, on the other, effectively 
assigning the risks, and thereby preventing the optimal 
outcome obtained in an environment of complete information 
(Holmström and Milgrom, 1991). 
 
This work provides a model that analyses the factors giving rise 
to an optimal agent remuneration system, on the basis of a 
specific degree of transfer of the construction risk to the 
contractor. The proposed model focuses on a standard work 
contract, but its main results may be applied to the construction 
stage of a concession contract or any other type of public-
private partnership. The next section outlines a basic model 
based on the assumption that the authorities are capable of 
observing and verifying the efforts made by the contractor to 
reduce costs. This assumption is then abandoned in the 
following section and, finally, we discuss the results and offer a 
summary of the main conclusions of the work. 
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METHODOLOGY: FORMULATION OF THE BASIC 
MODEL 
 
We consider a public authority (the principal in a principal-
agent relationship) that decides to build a specific public work 
by contracting a private company (agent). The contract defines 
the scope of the public work, specifies the qualities required 
and establishes a specific means of payment to the contractor. 
The principal will attempt to maximize a social utility function, 
through the optimization of the parameters defining the 
remuneration mechanism of the contract. This paper focuses on 
the said remuneration mechanisms and not on the procedure 
for selecting the contractor, and we shall subsequently assume 
that this then involves a principal-agent relationship in which 
both parties are already defined. 
 
We shall assume that the agent (contractor) presents a specific 
cost function for the work. These costs will depend to a certain 
degree on the contractor’s efforts to minimize the same. The 
variable representing these efforts shall be denominated e. We 
shall also assume a random cost component, as a series of 
unforeseen circumstances will commonly arise that can 
potentially affect the works, and that are (at least partially) 
beyond the control of the contractor. We shall then express the 
cost of the work as follows [Ec. 1] 
 
C = C0 – e + εp [1] 
 
 
Where C represents the cost of the work, C0 a cost parameter of 
the contractor, e (a value always greater or equal to 0) the 
efforts made by the contractor and εp a random term 
representing the deviation between the real cost and the cost 
considered by the contractor.  We shall assume that the public 
authority knows the C0 parameter of the contractor, and in this 
way may leave to one side any problem of adverse selection. 
The C0 value can be interpreted as the expected cost of the 
work with a minimum value of effort made by the contractor 
with respect to cost management, this minimum value being 
conventionally established as e = 0. 
 
Furthermore, the public authority may observe the cost 
made C (though with potential errors in measurement, as 
we shall see further on), and we shall initially assume that 
they may also observe and verify the effort e made by the 
contractor. This latter assumption shall be abandoned in 
the following section. 
 
We shall form the cost function in such a way that the 
variable εp has a normal distribution with a mean equal to 0 
and standard deviation equal to σp. It may be argued that 
the cost deviations are, in practice, almost always positive  
(that is to say, the real cost is greater than the expected 
cost), and where it would then be difficult for the mean 
value of εp to be equal to 0. However, it is necessary to take 
into account that a large proportion of the cost deviations 
in works are the result of design modifications imposed or 
accepted by the public authority and these cannot always 
be strictly taken as random. The cost deviations referred to 
in equation [1] are, by way of example, those due to 
deviations in the expected prices of inputs (such as the 
price of energy), and where these may indeed be positive or 
negative. In all events, the contractor may always 
incorporate a contingency percentage on the expected 
value based on past experience and in this way the resulting 
cost deviation would be one with respect to the said 
“normal” percentage. 
 
As we have already indicated, we shall assume that 
problems may appear when attempting to measure the cost 
made, and where a deviation εm appears between the 
measured cost (or acknowledged to the contractor) and the 
real cost. In a similar way as with the forecast errors, we 
shall assume that εm follows a normal distribution, with a 
mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation equivalent to σm. 
 
In our model the public authority shall pay the contractor 
according to a measured cost function (measured by the 
authorities, by an arbitrator or by any other means 
established in the contract), in accordance with a linear 
type equation (following Holmström and Milgrom, 1991), 
with a fixed component and a component representing a 
fraction of the cost. That is to say [Ec. 2]; 
 
t  = α + ω Cm [2] 
 
 
In this equation, t is the amount paid by the public 
authority to the company, α is a parameter representing a 
fixed payment made to the company, ω is a second 
parameter representing a fraction of the cost reimbursed to 
the company and Cm represents the measured cost. The α 
and ω parameters will be established in the contract and 
the object of this paper is essentially to determine the 
values of the said parameters that optimize a social utility 
function. 
A value ω=0 would be equivalent to a fixed-price contract, 
with maximum transfer of construction risk to the 
contractor. To the other extreme, a contract in which ω=1 
would imply a cost-plus or cost reimbursement contract in 
which all the cost deviations would be assumed by the 
public authority with no construction risk transfer to the 
contractor. Note that as εm = Cm – C,  the equation [2] may 
be written in the following manner [Ec. 3]. Where C 
represents the cost actually made. In turn, when 
considering [1], we may write [Ec. 4].  
 
 
 t  = α + ω (C + εm) [3] 
 
 t  = α + ω (C0 – e + εp + εm) [4] 
 
 
This means that the contractor’s remuneration consists of a 
fixed amount plus a fraction of the sum of the cost 
expected by the contractor and the deviation due to the 
measurement error (εm) and to the forecast error (εp). This 
distinction between measurement error and forecast error 
was employed by Baron and Besanko (1988) in an 
application for public procurement contracts in the Defence 
sector, due to their different effects on the incentives to 
the contractor, as we shall see further on. 
On establishing equation [4], the contractor’s expected 
remuneration would then be as follows [Ec. 5]. While the 
variance in income received by the contractor, which we 
shall assign as σt
2
, would then be [Ec. 6]. Together with the 
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social utility function, defined further on, it shall be 
necessary to consider the restriction established by the 
contractor’s utility function, and where this is taken to be 
[Ec. 7]. 
 
 
E [t] = α + ω (C0 – e) [5] 
 
σt
2
 = ω
2
(σm
2
+σp
2
) [6] 
 
Uf=E[z]–ψ(e)–rfσz
2
 [7] 
 
 
Where Uf is the utility of the contractor and the variable z = 
t – C, that is to say, the difference between the contractor’s 
income and the cost made. The function ψ (e), with its sign, 
represents the disutility for the contractor of the 
management efforts made. This means to say that the 
contractor manages to reduce by an effort e the production 
costs of the work, but the making of these efforts implies a 
certain cost for the contractor that shall be incorporated 
within their utility function. We shall also assume that ψ´(e) 
> 0  and that ψ´´(e) > 0, Which means that the ψ (e) 
function is strictly increasing and convex. 
 
In this equation, rf is a parameter representing the agent’s 
attitude to risk and, when expressed in other terms, Uf 
would then be the certainty equivalent of the returns 
expected by this latter. If the agent were risk averse, this 
would then imply an rf value strictly greater than zero, 
while in the case of risk neutrality this would suppose an r f 
equal to zero. In our model, the agent will generally be 
taken to be risk averse, though we shall study the 
implications arising in the specific case that r f = 0. In all 
events we may exclude the possibility that the agent be risk 
seeking, and from which it will then follow that [Ec. 8]. It 
may then be seen that [Ec. 9-10]. And equation [7] may 
then be written as [Ec. 11]. 
 
 
rf σz
2
 ≥ 0 [8] 
 
E[z] = E [t – C] = α + (ω – 1) (C0 – e) [9] 
 
 σz
2
 = ω
2
 σm
2
 + (ω – 1)
2
 σp
2
 [10] 
 
Uf=α+(ω–1)(C0–e) –ψ(e)–rf[ω
2
σm
2
+(ω–1)
2
σp
2
] [11] 
 
 
However, in order for the agent to carry out its activity, it 
will have to obtain an utility greater or equal to the 
alternative of not carrying out any. If we take this latter 
alternative to represent an utility equal to zero, the agent’s 
participation is then dependent on the following [Ec. 12] 
 
The social utility function, which should be maximised  by 
the public authority, shall, in turn, be formed by the 
expected benefits produced by the construction of the work 
for society as a whole minus all costs incurred in making 
this building or work available, and including, among other 
factors, the costs derived from the risk aversion of both the 
agent and the authority. In this way, the social utility 
function may be given by [Ec. 13]. 
In this equation Us is the social utility that is to be 
maximized and the variable S represents the social benefit 
provided by the construction of the work throughout its 
service life (logically expressed in terms of present value), 
and including both the benefits for users and the positive or 
negative externalities produced (with their corresponding 
sign). We shall take a given value for S that should be 
sufficiently large to ensure that Us > 0, as failing this it 
would then be preferable not to carry out the work. As may 
be seen, equation [13] includes a term that represents the 
cost due to the risk aversion of the public authority, and 
where rg is the parameter defining this risk attitude. We 
shall assume that this rg parameter is generally positive. 
While in agency theory it is common to consider the 
principal (in this case the public authority) as risk neutral (rg 
= 0) (Eisenhardt, 1989), it is difficult to maintain this 
position today in view of the budgetary restrictions 
(frequently of constitutional nature) now facing most 
governments. 
 
Equation [13] also includes the excess burden of public 
funds, given by the term λE[t], where λ is a parameter 
(attributed with a value greater than zero) that 
characterizes the tax system of the country in question. The 
value (1 + λ) is normally referred to as the marginal cost of 
public funds, this being a concept that incorporates various 
aspects and including the distortion introduced by the tax 
system in the decisions of the economic agents and the cost 
of tax administration. In other words, we are then 
supposing that the disutility to taxpayers inflicted by levying 
an additional monetary unit shall be equivalent to (1 + λ) 
monetary units, where the value of λ depends on the 
institutional framework of each country and the tax 
provisions used to obtain additional public funds. This 
weighting of public funds is not taken into account in the 
majority of cost-benefit analysis and it is, instead, implicitly 
established that λ = 0. However, Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
considered it reasonable to establish a value λ = 0.3 for the 
American economy and Kleven and Kreiner (2003) estimate 
λ values of between 0.09 and 0.80 for different OECD 
countries when considering a proportional tax increase for 
the tax system as a whole. In all events, this concerns 
values that are by no means negligible. A detailed study of 
the concept of the marginal cost of public funds may be 
found in Dahlby (2008). When considering [5] and [11] and 
on substituting certain terms by their values, the social 
utility equation may then be expressed as follows in [Ec. 
14].  On this definition of the social utility function, the 
optimisation problem may be established in the following 
terms [Ec. 15].  
 
 
Uf  ≥ 0 [12] 
 
Us=S–E[C]–ψ(e)–rfσz
2
–rgσt
2
–λE[t] [13] 
 
Us = S – (1 + λ) {C0 – e  + ψ (e) + rf [ω
2
 σm
2
 + (ω – 1)
2
 σp
2
]} – 
rg ω
2
(σp
2
 + σm
2
) – λ Uf [14] 
 
Max(Uf, e, ω){Us} [15] 
subject to restriction [12]. 
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When considering that the social utility function is 
monotonically decreasing with Uf, and that λ > 0, the 
solution to the previous problem is then as follows [Ec. 16 
to 18]. 
 
 
Uf = 0 [16] 
 
 
ψ´(e*) = 1 [17] 
 
 
 [18] 
 
 
In this way we may obtain the optimal effort e* that shall 
be contractually demanded of the contractor as we have 
assumed that this value may be observed and verified by 
the public authority, together with the values of the 
parameters optimising the remuneration mechanism of the 
contract from a social utility perspective. The parameter α* 
may be obtained from [16], when taking into account 
equation [11]. As may be observed, the parameter ω* shall 
have a value between 0 and 1. The value of ω* shall be 0 if 
the contractor is risk neutral (rf = 0) and the public 
authority is risk averse (rg > 0). In this case the optimal 
contract implies the total transfer of construction risk to 
the contractor. However, the risk neutrality of the public 
authority (rg = 0) does not imply a ω* value equal to 1: it is 
necessary, furthermore, that there are no cost 
measurement errors (σm
2
 = 0). The optimal solution, purely 
under these conditions, would be that the public authority 
assumes the entire construction risk. Finally, it should be 
noted that under risk neutral conditions of both the 
contractor and the public authority, there is no specific 
solution for the value of the parameters defining the 
payment system to the contractor, as there are infinite 
pairs of α* and ω* values that optimise the contract. 
 
 
 
 [19] 
 
Max(Uf, e, ω){Us} [20] 
 
 
Uf = 0 [21] 
 
 
– (1 + λ) [– 1+ ψ´(e*)] + ψ´´(e*){(1 + λ) [2rf σp
2
 (– ψ´(e*))] + 
(1 + λ) [2rf σm
2
 (1 – ψ´(e*)) ] + 2rg(σp
2
 + σm
2
)(1- ψ´(e*))} = 0
 [22] 
 
 
 [23] 
 
 
 
 
MODEL UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
 
The model developed in the preceding section is based on a 
series of hypotheses that may generally be considered as 
reasonable. This may even hold true, at least in certain local 
environments, with respect to the hypothesis regarding the 
awareness of the public authority of the C0 parameter of 
the contractor. However, the hypothesis that the public 
authority may observe and verify the effort e made by the 
contractor is far more difficult to maintain. Strictly 
speaking, and under conditions of certainty, the authorities 
have no need to directly observe the e value if they are 
aware of the C0 parameter and may observe the cost value 
performed C. However, if this inability to observe the e 
value is compounded by the presence of a random term in 
the cost function, there is then a problem of moral hazard: 
if there is a specific cost deviation, the public authority 
cannot know whether this is due to a purely random factor 
or due to insufficient effort by the contractor. 
 
Under these new conditions, we may attempt to establish 
the optimal system of incentives that bring into line the 
contractor’s objectives with those of the public authority, 
through the parameters defining the remuneration system 
of the contract. 
 
 
Ψ(e) = k e
2
/2 [24] 
 
 
 [25] 
 
 [26] 
 
The development of this model follows the same steps as the 
preceding section up to equations [11] and [12] that describe 
the utility function of the contractor and their degree of risk 
sharing. From this stage on, and under the new assumption that 
the public authority cannot observe the e value, it will now be 
necessary to add a further restriction, given by the 
maximisation of the contractor’s utility, that may be obtained in 
the following manner [Ec. 19]. On reconsidering the problem of 
maximising the social utility function, we shall now take into 
account this new restriction. That is to say [Ec. 20], subject to 
restrictions [12] and [19], and where Us has the same 
expression as in equation [14]. The solution to this problem is 
then given by [Ec. 21 to 23]. 
 
In order to simplify the exposition, and advance somewhat in 
the interpretation of the results, it is possible to consider a 
specific function ψ (e). In economic literature it is common to 
take the following type of quadratic cost functions [Ec. 24]. 
With Ψ´(e) = ke  and Ψ´´(e) = k , where k is a constant greater 
than 0. Among the authors using quadratic cost functions, we 
may refer to Arrow and Radner (1979), Gibbons (1998), Rob and 
Zemsky (2002), Socorro (2007) and Martimort and Pouyet 
(2008). When employing this ψ (e) function, the solution to the 
maximisation problem is then given by equation [21] plus [Ec. 
25 and 26]. 
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)1(
*
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2
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It may then be seen that the value of ω* is set within the range 
0 ≤ ω* < 1, while the e* value will always be positive. Under 
conditions of risk neutrality of the contractor (rf = 0), the ω* 
value will always be equal to 0 (that is to say, with total transfer 
of the construction risk to the contractor), even in the case that 
the public authority is also risk neutral. However, a zero 
construction risk transfer to the contractor cannot be the 
optimal solution in this model, as ω* cannot reach a value equal 
to 1, even in the case that rg = 0  and  σm
2
 = 0, though it may 
come close to 1 for high k values. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
When taking the quadratic function Ψ(e) = k e
2
/2, the result 
expressed by equation [17] in the complete information model 
will then remain as follows (Ec 27). 
 
When comparing the result given by equation [25] , it may be 
seen that the effort made by the contractor to control 
production costs under conditions of information symmetry will 
generally be greater than that under conditions of information 
asymmetry, as ω* ≥ 0. The effort made by the contractor under 
conditions of information asymmetry will only be equal to that 
given by [27] in the case that the agent is risk neutral. 
 
Similarly, on comparing the equation [18] in section 2 with [26] 
in section 3, it may be seen that the ω* parameter is lower 
under conditions of information asymmetry, which then infers 
that the optimal degree of construction risk transfer to the 
contractor in this latter case would be greater than that given 
under conditions of information symmetry. 
 
These results are not totally intuitive and take on the following 
economic consequences: under conditions of information 
asymmetry, the public authority cannot verify (and 
subsequently cannot contract) the effort made by the agent. As 
such, in order to motivate the correct management of 
construction costs, the public authority would have to employ a 
remuneration system based on the greater transfer of 
construction risk to the contractor, in spite of the risk aversion 
of the same. However, this risk aversion restricts the use of 
incentives, and in this way the effort made by the contractor is 
lower than the optimal obtained under conditions of 
information symmetry. These results are summarized in figure 
2, where the suffix c indicates complete information conditions 
and the suffix a indicates asymmetric information. 
 
When focusing on the more common case in which both the 
contractor and the public authority are risk averse and where 
there is information asymmetry, on the basis of equation [26] 
we may then observe the opposite effects with regards to the 
optimal transfer of construction risk provided by an increase in 
the σm
2
 and σp
2
 variances, respectively. A greater variance in the 
measurement errors, given by σm
2
, leads to a lower ω* value, 
that is to say, a greater transfer of the construction risk to the 
contractor. To the contrary, a greater variance in forecast 
errors, given by σp
2
, implies a greater ω* value and an ensuing 
lower transfer of the construction risk to the contractor under 
an optimal situation. Furthermore, as ω* increases with any 
increase in rf, the greater risk aversion of the contractor will 
lead to a smaller transfer of the construction risk to this latter in 
an optimal situation. On the other hand, the greater risk 
aversion of the public authority (given by rg) will lead to a lower 
ω* value and, subsequently, the greater transfer of 
construction risk to the contractor in an optimal situation. 
Finally, it may be seen that an increase in the marginal cost of 
public funds (given by an increase in parameter λ) leads to a 
higher ω* value and, subsequently, a lower construction risk 
transfer to the contractor. 
 
 
As such, and by way of summary of the results of this work, we 
may state that the optimal construction risk transfer to the 
contractor decreases with rises in the variance in the forecast 
errors of construction costs (σp
2
), the risk aversion of the 
contractor (rf) and the marginal cost of public funds (λ). To the 
contrary, the optimal transfer of construction risk to the 
contractor rises with a greater variance in cost measurement 
errors (σm
2
) and the greater risk aversion of the authorities (rg). 
The results given by equations [25] and [26] may be applied not 
just to the analysis of construction risk as a whole, but to each 
individual risk forming part of construction risk, and taking the 
corresponding variances. 
 
By way of example, one could analyse the risk due to variations 
in the prices of the contractor’s inputs. The results obtained in 
this work show that some traditional clauses contained in work 
contracts, such as price index formulas, do not generally lead to 
an optimal situation. Firstly, the potential presence of risk 
aversion by the public authorities would lead, under an optimal 
situation, to a degree of risk sharing, and not the complete 
assignment of risk to the authority. Secondly, the potential 
presence of measurement errors (in this case, a discrepancy 
between the values given by the application of the indexing 
formula and the real value of prices for the contractor) would 
also lead to a certain transfer of risk to the contractor, even in 
the case that the public authority were risk neutral. 
 
 
Figure 2 Relationship between optimal effort and optimal risk transfer. Source: 
author. 
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